BMC Public Health by Zhang, Ying et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Evaluating Syndromic surveillance systems at
institutions of higher education (IHEs): A
retrospective analysis of the 2009 H1N1
influenza pandemic at two universities
Ying Zhang1, Larissa May2 and Michael A Stoto1*
Abstract
Background: Syndromic surveillance has been widely adopted as a real-time monitoring tool for timely response to
disease outbreaks. During the second wave of the pH1N1 pandemic in Fall 2009, two major universities in
Washington, DC collected data that were potentially indicative of influenza-like illness (ILI) cases in students and staff.
In this study, our objectives were three-fold. The primary goal of this study was to characterize the impact of pH1N1
on the campuses as clearly as possible given the data available and their likely biases. In addition, we sought to
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the data series themselves, in order to inform these two universities and
other institutions of higher education (IHEs) about real-time surveillance systems that are likely to provide the most
utility in future outbreaks (at least to the extent that it is possible to generalize from this analysis).
Methods: We collected a wide variety of data that covered both student ILI cases reported to medical and non-
medical staff, employee absenteeism, and hygiene supply distribution records (from University A only). Communication
data were retrieved from university broadcasts, university preparedness websites, and H1N1-related on campus media
reports. Regional data based on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Outpatient Influenza-like Illness
Surveillance Network (CDC ILINet) surveillance network, American College Health Association (ACHA) pandemic
influenza surveillance data, and local Google Flu Trends were used as external data sets. We employed a “triangulation”
approach for data analysis in which multiple contemporary data sources are compared to identify time patterns that are
likely to reflect biases as well as those that are more likely to be indicative of actual infection rates.
Results: Medical personnel observed an early peak at both universities immediately after school began in early
September and a second peak in early November; only the second peak corresponded to patterns in the
community at large. Self-reported illness to university deans’ offices was also relatively increased during mid-term
exam weeks. The overall volume of pH1N1-related communication messages similarly peaked twice, corresponding
to the two peaks of student ILI cases.
Conclusions: During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, both University A and B experienced a peak number of ILI cases at the
beginning of the Fall term. This pattern, seen in surveillance systems at these universities and to a lesser extent in data
from other IHEs, most likely resulted from students bringing the virus back to campus from their home states coupled
with a sudden increase in population density in dormitories and lecture halls. Through comparison of data from
different syndromic surveillance data streams, paying attention to the likely biases in each over time, we have
determined, at least in the case of the pH1N1 pandemic, that student health center data more accurately depicted
disease transmission on campus at both universities during the Fall 2009 pandemic than other available data sources.
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Background
In the spring of 2009, a novel H1N1 influenza virus,
now denoted pH1N1, emerged in North America and
spread to the rest of the world in less than two months
[1]. Soon afterwards, it became apparent that children
and young adults were particularly vulnerable to infec-
tion [2-4]. This demographic pattern posed unique
challenges for institutions of higher education (IHEs),
which predominantly serve young adults. Moreover,
some large residential universities operate as nearly
self-sufficient communities in which the homogeneity
of the campus population increases vulnerability to
infectious diseases that target young adults, and trans-
mission in universities can thus catalyze community-
wide transmission [5].
Concerned with the re-emergence of the virus when
students returned at the end of the summer, IHEs rea-
lized the need for surveillance systems capable of pro-
viding real-time situational awareness to guide the
implementation of preventive measures to protect stu-
dents’ health and contingency plans to maintain basic
educational functions. During the pH1N1 pandemic,
the President’s Council of Advisor on Science and
Technology (PCAST) was recommending using syn-
dromic surveillance, which, by using pre-diagnostic
data, is thought to have a distinct advantage over the
traditional surveillance method in terms of timeliness
[6]. In response, the American College Health Associa-
tion (ACHA) initiated a system to gather such data
from IHEs and publish it weekly [7]. Surveillance of
school absenteeism and other syndromic surveillance
methods were used during pH1n1 outbreak in other
countries as well [8,9].
The validity and utility of syndromic surveillance,
however, or of particular types of syndromic data, are
not well understood [10]. In order to assess its validity
in IHE settings, we compared data from two major uni-
versities in Washington, DC that collected a variety of
data that were potentially indicative of influenza-like ill-
ness (ILI) in students, faculty, and staff with each other
and with external data. University A compiled and
reviewed these data in real time to monitor and inform
the university’s response to the H1N1 pandemic, while
University B served as a comparison for this analysis.
The primary goal of this analysis was to characterize the
impact of pH1N1 on the campuses as clearly as possible
given the data available and their likely biases. In addi-
tion, we sought to evaluate the strengths and weak-
nesses of the data series themselves, in order to inform
these two universities and other IHEs about real-time
surveillance systems that are likely to provide the most
utility in future outbreaks (at least to the extent that it
is possible to generalize from this analysis).
Methods
Data Collection
We collected a wide a variety of data that covered both
student influenza-like illness (ILI) cases reported to stu-
dent health center (SHC) and hospital emergency
department (ED) visits at both universities, and student
ILI cases reported to non-medical staff, employee absen-
teeism, and hygiene supplies distribution records from
University A. Unless otherwise noted below, all data ser-
ies were available on a weekly basis. The sources are
described in detail in Additional File 1, and summarized
in table in Additional File 2.
The information environment
University broadcasts, preparedness website updates,
and H1N1-related on-campus media reports were
retrieved from emails, web pages and paper prints avail-
able on campus. H1N1-related messages were classified
into five major categories for university A, which
included information about the advice line, presence of
flu cases, vaccination, instructions on voluntary report-
ing to deans and the availability of personal hygiene
supplies. For university B, seven categories were avail-
able, including student health center data, hospital
emergency department visits, pH1N1 hotline calls, vac-
cine and personal hygiene supplies, as well as the
requirement for a physician’s note for excused absences
due to illness. All messages were counted based on their
appearance in any of the media sources outlined above.
In addition, relevant policies were collected and
reviewed by interviewing key staff members.
Student ILI cases reported to medical personnel
The total number of ILI visits to the student health ser-
vice and telephone consultations were collected using
the following case definition: fever (> 100 F) AND
(cough and/or sore throat) in the absence of a known
cause other than influenza. Student identification data
were reviewed by SHC staff to ensure that individuals
were counted only once. Data were available on a daily
basis from August 29, 2009 to April 30, 2010, and were
aggregated by adding cases in each 7-day period from
Saturday to the following Friday.
The number of clinic visits of ILI patients aged 17-24
years old at the EDs of hospitals associated with both
universities was obtained from the ED electronic health
records in the aggregate (number of cases/week). Uni-
versity A’s ED data were retrieved based on the follow-
ing criteria: age 17-24 years and fever, with other causes
of fever than influenza manually filtered out. University
B’s ED visits for ILI were counted using following cri-
teria: age 17-24 years old and a chief complaint of “flu”
or “fever,” or a discharge diagnosis of “influenza” or
“viral syndrome.” Student status was not available from
either university ED. Data were available on a daily basis
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from August 29, 2009 to April 30, 2010, and were
aggregated by adding cases in each 7-day period from
Saturday to the following Friday.
Student ILI cases reported to non-medical personnel
(University A only)
The number reported includes ILI cases in student ath-
letes (as reported by their team trainers), student ILI
cases self-reported to the deans of all four undergradu-
ate schools, and ILI cases reported by resident assistants.
Data other than deans’ reports were available on a
weekly basis from August 29, 2009 to April 30, 2010.
Deans’ reports were not available from all deans until
September 12, 2009.
Employee absenteeism data (University A only)
Employee absenteeism data include real-time reports on
ILI-related absences among Facilities Office and Dining
Services staff, and employee absenteeism from 2009 and
2008, retrieved retrospectively from a payroll system
that tracks employee absences for compensation pur-
poses. The closest available data for non-union employ-
ees’ were “unscheduled leave” days, whereas for
unionized employees it was “sick leave.” In order to sim-
plify the analysis, the two data sources were added
together with the awareness that the ILI-related absen-
teeism for both groups of employees may have been
overestimated. No faculty members or student workers
are represented in this dataset.
Supply distribution data (University A only)
Supply distribution data include the aggregate number
of pre-packaged meals, masks and thermometers picked
up in student resident halls, based on reports from the
residence hall offices (RHO). The data were available
from August 28, 2009 to April 10, 2010 on weekly basis.
External Data
For comparison purposes we used data based on the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) ILI-
Net surveillance data [11], which reflect the proportion
of outpatients visits that were for ILI, the American Col-
lege Health Association (ACHA) data (labelled “attack
rate” in ACHA sources) [12], and Google Flu Trends
data (web queries) for Washington, DC [13]. Both the
ILINet and ACHA data were available nationally and for
Region 3 (Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia).
Data Preparation
For the ACHA data series, the “attack rate” is defined by
the ACHA as the number of weekly reports of new
cases divided by the number of students in the IHEs’
reports that week for each state, which were grouped
according to CDC’s regional categories (note that this is
not the standard epidemiological definition). ILI cases
and the school population of University A and B were
removed from the ACHA region 3 data to minimize the
influence on this external data stream from the study
population.
To make the data from different sources comparable,
all data, including the ACHA data (ILI attack rate),
CDC ILINet data (percentage of hospital visits with ILI),
and Google Flu Trends data (influenza related web
queries) were normalized into an activity index by divid-
ing the actual count in each week by the average count
for that data series for the period from August 28
through December 18, 2009, a period for which data
were available for all series and reflected the height of
the Fall 2009 wave of pH1N1. This analysis is intended
to identify the timing of the outbreak on each campus,
not the absolute level of cases. In this analysis, we have
made the assumption that the number of students is
constant throughout the semester, at least relative to the
fluctuation in the number of cases.
Data Analysis
Because there are no data that describe the actual rates of
pH1N1 infection, or its consequences, on the two cam-
puses or the community in which they sit, we adopted a
“triangulation” approach in which multiple contemporary
data sources, each with different expected biases, are
compared to identify time patterns that are likely to
reflect biases versus those that are more likely to be indi-
cative of actual infection rates. This public health systems
research approach is grounded in the understanding that
surveillance data are the result of decisions made by
patients, health care providers, and public health profes-
sionals about health-care seeking behaviour and provi-
sion of health care and reporting suspected or confirmed
cases to health authorities. Moreover, every element of
this decision-making is influenced by the informational
environment (i.e. media coverage, implementation of
active surveillance), processing and reacting to the infor-
mation on an individual level (i.e. the health care seeker’s
self-assessment of risk, incentives for seeking medical
attention and self-isolation, the health care provider’s
ordering of laboratory tests), and technical barriers (i.e.
communication infrastructure for data exchange, labora-
tory capacity), all of which change constantly.
IRB approval
One of the authors (YZ) had access to some identified data
in her efforts to compile data for operational purposes at
University A, but all of the analyses for this paper were
conducted with aggregate data only, and this research was
treated as “exempt” by the IRBs of both universities.
Results
In Panel A of Figure 1, the pH1N1 related messages
reached its peak volume in late August and early Sep-
tember at University A, among which six out of sixteen
Zhang et al. BMC Public Health 2011, 11:591
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/591
Page 3 of 8
messages were the situation-update announcements of
the flu cases either in the region or on campus. Other
messages included the instruction on utilizing on-
campus resources, such as the H1N1 advice line and
accessing personal hygiene supplies, as well as the
recommendation for self-reporting of influenza-like-
illness to deans. Later in November, there was another
cluster of communication messages providing a situation
update of flu cases on campus and the availability of
H1N1 vaccination, while the volume was much lower
compared to early September.
For University B, as shown in Panel B of Figure 1,
communication messages were also clustered in early
September and November. Four situation updates of flu
cases were released during the first peak, together with
instructions on accessing the student health center, vis-
iting the university hospital emergency department, the
H1N1 hotline and provision and use of personal hygiene
supplies. Due to the policy change regarding excused
absences, three messages were sent out requiring medi-
cal documentation to support any ILI related absence
during mid-terms and finals.
As shown in Figure 2, there were two peaks in the
2009 Fall Semester at University A, the larger one in
early September as students returned from summer
vacation and the other in late October to early Novem-
ber. Reports to undergraduate deans were elevated rela-
tive to the other data series in October (i.e. they did not
fall as sharply between the two peaks), which is the
mid-term exam period. Figure 2 also demonstrates that
this pattern differs from the ACHA ILI surveillance net-
work data for Region 3, which exhibits a larger peak in
late October than in September, and from the CDC ILI-
Net for Region 3 and the Google Flu Trends data for
Washington, DC, both of which show only one peak in
late October.
Figure 3, for University A only, compares the number
of ILI case reports to athletic trainers (AT) and resident
assistants (RA), RHO requests for supplies, and calls to
the H1N1 advice line compared to SHC visits and
dean’s office reports. Relative to the other series, both
AT and RA reports and RHO supply requests peaked
earlier in September and are relatively higher than other
Figure 1 Categorical pH1N1-related message timing and
volume. Panel a: University A. Panel b: University B.
Figure 2 University A student influenza-like illness (ILI) cases
reported to student health center (SHC), hospital emergency
department (HED) and deans’ offices compared to regional
American College Health Association (ACHA) influenza
surveillance, CDC Outpatient Influenza-like Illness Surveillance
Network (ILINet) and local Google Flu Trends data.
Figure 3 Influenza-like illness (ILI) case reports to athletic
trainers (AT) and resident assistants (RA), residence hall offices
(RHO) requests for supplies, and calls to the H1N1 advice line
compared to student health center (SHC) visits and dean’s
office reports, University A only.
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series, perhaps reflecting the higher volume of messages
(shown in Figure 1a) in September.
University A’s employee absenteeism data are shown
in Figure 4. Neither the real-time ILI-related employee
absenteeism data nor retrospective data from the payroll
systems exhibited any peaks in the Fall of 2009, suggest-
ing that employees, who by and large are older than stu-
dents, were apparently not as affected by pH1N1.
Figure 5 compares the data SHC and ED data from
both universities, with the ACHA and ILINet data for
Region 3 as a reference. The SHC data for the two uni-
versities are comparable. However, the ED data are not:
University B’s ED data exhibit a larger second peak in
October than University A’s ED data. University B’s ED
peak appears consistent with ILI activity in the larger
community. Of note, in University B, the first peak of
ILI activity is seen primarily in SHC visits, while the sec-
ond peak is seen in ED visits.
Discussion
The primary limitation of this analysis is the lack of defi-
nitive knowledge about the actual number of pH1N1
cases at the two universities - a “gold standard.” To
address this problem we developed an approach that
compares ("triangulates”) multiple data systems, each
with its own expected biases over time, to identify those
that most likely mirror actual disease trends. Epidemiolo-
gists are typically aware of these potential biases in a qua-
litative sense, and present their analysis of the available
data with appropriate caveats. In our approach, which
benefits from hindsight, we attempt to use information
about the likely direction and time patterns of these
biases to understand the surveillance system and the
validity and utility of different syndromic surveillance
data sources. This type of analysis is necessarily qualita-
tive and contextual; rather than serving as a recipe for
doing this in other settings, this analysis should be seen
as an example that illustrates the concept. This analysis
also illustrates to the call in U.S. National Health Security
Strategy Implementation Plan (released for public com-
ment in 2010) for the development, refinement, and
wide-spread implementation of quality improvement
tools, specifically methods “to collect data ... from real
incidents ... to identify gaps, [and] recommend and apply
programs to mitigate those gaps [14].”
Another limitation of the data analysis is the uncer-
tainty of whether the ILI cases captured by the surveil-
lance system were pH1N1. As recommended by the
CDC interim guidelines [15], both universities stopped
routinely testing for pH1N1 in early September.
Although the CDC Virologic Surveillance data for
region 3 suggested that the predominant proportion of
the test positive specimens were subtyped as pH1N1,
the total percentage for test positive samples varied
from 4.4% to 55.9% in weeks 35 to 50 [16]. Because this
proportion varies so much, trends in reported ILI cases
may not reflect trends in actual H1N1 infection.
As described in more detail below, this approach sug-
gests that the peak in cases at both universities at the
beginning of the semester, a peak not seen in data for
the surrounding community, is probably real and a
reflection of expected disease dynamics. The lower peak,
especially at University A, when pH1N1 was widespread
in the community might reflect the removal of suscepti-
ble cases earlier in the semester, or simply surveillance
fatigue. This analysis also suggests surveillance artifacts
- surveillance fatigue and changing incentives driven by
the exam schedule - that are likely to influence surveil-
lance data in future outbreaks, and that should be taken
into account in the interpretation of these data.
Figure 4 Real-time and retrospective employee absenteeism,
University A only.
Figure 5 Influenza-like illness (ILI) cases reported to student
health centers (SHC) and hospital emergency departments
(HED) from both universities compared to regional CDC
Outpatient Influenza-like Illness Surveillance Network
(ILINet) data.
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Unique transmission pattern in IHEs
Both universities experienced the first and the highest
peak in student ILI cases immediately after Fall semester
classes started in early September 2009, which corre-
sponds to peaks found in other universities and colleges
in Region 3 (Delaware, the District of Columbia, Mary-
land, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia). It
should be noted, however, that both of these universities
contributed to the ACHA reports. The CDC ILINet
data for the same region and Google Flu Trends data
for Washington, DC, on the other hand, did not peak
until late October. University A also experienced a sec-
ond, lower peak in cases with a two-week delay in early
November, according to the SHC and ED data. When
comparing the SHC and ED data from University A and
University B (as shown in Figure 5), University B’s ED
data differ from other data sets from both universities,
and show a transmission pattern that resembles the
CDC ILINet data. Since the ILI cases from both hospital
EDs are not restricted to students, they include not only
student cases but also other 17 to 24 year old adults in
the community and from other parts of the city. Unlike
University A which is not inaccessible by mass transit,
University B is located in a part of Washington that has
a large population of young adults and easy access to
the public transportation, so the higher volume of
young adult visits at University B ED during November,
when the virus was circulating in the general population,
may not have come from the college population.
In the comparison between ACHA and CDC ILINet
data across all states, the tendency of an early increase
in ILI cases among college students in seven out of ten
regions, as shown in Additional File 3. Together with
our findings, this suggests that the difference in the tim-
ing of peaks reflects the differences between college stu-
dents and the general public. This is plausible given that
students are in an age group at higher risk for infection.
Moreover, students returning to campus for the Fall
term may have carried the virus from their home states,
and the sudden increase of population density in dormi-
tories and lecture halls may also have contributed to the
rapid onset of the outbreak on campus due to facilitated
transmission. Thus, it seems likely that on a national
level, residential IHEs tended to experience an early
peak immediately after the Fall term began in 2009.
Influence of incentives and informational environment
All of the data analysed in this report are based, to some
degree, on students and staff taking action based their
illness. Such behaviour is driven not only by the fact of
being sick, but also by the incentives to report, including
perceptions of barriers to help-seeking behaviour (i.e.
geographic distance, queuing, chance of exposure to
other infected patients), the likely benefit to be gained
(medical and non-medical) by reporting, the timeliness
of the help to be delivered, as well as the informational
environment the students and staff are exposed to. In
particular, two factors - surveillance fatigue and report-
ing incentives - seem capable of explaining some of the
patterns in the data.
Surveillance fatigue
As seen in Figure 1, the Fall semester at both universi-
ties began with a high awareness of pH1N1. At Univer-
sity A, a number of new ad hoc surveillance systems
were developed, some of which required a substantial
reporting burden by students and staff at the student
health center and deans’ offices, athletic trainers and
RAs, and of course the students themselves. Over the
course of the semester, however, it became apparent
that although pH1N1 was widespread in children and
young adults, it was not as virulent as feared [17,18],
and the frequency of H1N1 messages dropped. It would
not be surprising, therefore, that staff who put a sub-
stantial effort into reporting ILI cases in September
were less enthusiastic about it as the semester wore on,
and possibly less complete in their reporting. Moreover,
since most students who presented themselves for medi-
cal attention early in the semester did not receive anti-
viral or other specific treatment as per the CDC guide-
lines, it seems likely that their friends and roommates
who became ill later in the semester saw no reason to
seek medical care.
Surveillance fatigue is likely to be more obvious in sys-
tems that use human resources not primarily designated
for disease prevention and health promotion. For
instance, the reports from the RA at University A
increased to their highest level in the first week after
classes resumed and dropped dramatically afterwards.
Although ILI activity could still be observed from other
data sources after the second peak through Spring 2010,
the reports from RAs completely stopped at the end of
November. The RA reporting system might have been
sensitive to student ILI cases in the early stages, consid-
ering the relatively low barrier of utilizing the resources
(close proximity, no queuing), and the expectation of
immediate help (supply distribution, accommodation
relocation). However, when the reporters and those
receiving the reports are all laypersons to public health
practice, fading interest can be magnified in the micro-
environment between the two parties.
Reporting incentives
At University A, undergraduate students were instructed
to notify their deans about their influenza-like illness as
a substitute for medical proof of illness otherwise
required to justify absence from class. This was pub-
lished on August 28, 2009, and not emphasized after-
wards. However, as noted in Figure 2, reports to
undergraduate deans at University A were elevated
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relative to the other series in October, when mid-term
exams were scheduled in many classes. Thus it seems
likely that the relative number of reports to deans at
University A during this period (or more precisely the
failure for the number to drop as sharply as other data
series), may reflect the increased need for students to
have medical excuses for exams rather than for ordinary
classes, where attendance is usually not taken.
Evaluation of syndromic surveillance data systems
To translate these results into recommendations for
IHEs regarding the design and implementation of sur-
veillance systems for future disease outbreaks, other fac-
tors must also be taken into account. For instance,
surveillance activities conducted by trained health care
workers are more likely to capture actual ILI cases
based on clinical findings. Moreover, well-informed
healthcare workers who conduct surveillance as part of
their regular responsibilities are more likely to maintain
a relatively stable and predictable report triggering
threshold, in line with the CDC and WHO (World
Health Organization) guidelines [19-21]. On the other
hand, ad hoc reporting systems may be more sensitive
to changes in the informational environment. When the
reporting channels are relatively new, communication
messages designed to encourage their use might have a
short-term effect when they are released, but surveil-
lance fatigue may set in quickly when the intensity of
media coverage decreases and public interest fades. In
addition, the expected benefits of presenting oneself to
the reporting system, and how easily reports can be
made, may also have an impact on the direction and
scope of the bias. In a pandemic characterized by low
virulence and limited treatment options for young
adults, the expected benefits of seeking care decreased
over time, except for the mid-term exam effect observed
in Deans’ reports at University A. Thus, this assessment
suggests that at least for outbreaks similar to pH1N1,
student health center data, though biased by surveillance
fatigue, provides the most accurate and useful data.
Conclusions
During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, University A and B
both experienced a peak number of ILI cases at the
beginning of the Fall term. This pattern, seen in a vari-
ety of surveillance systems at these universities and to a
lesser extent in data from other IHEs, most likely results
from students bringing the virus back to campus from
their home states coupled with a sudden increase in
population density in dormitories and lecture halls.
Through comparison of data from different syndromic
surveillance data streams, paying attention to the likely
biases in each over time, we have determined, at least in
the case of the pH1N1 pandemic, that student health
center data more accurately depicted transmission on
campus in both universities during the Fall 2009 pan-
demic than other available data sources. Although main-
taining an unduplicated list from visits and phone calls
was time consuming, it was felt to be necessary to man-
age the situation. Other systems that were used at Uni-
versity A required major staff efforts to collect the data
and were apparently less accurate. Reporting systems
based on student reports to their deans may be rela-
tively inflated during examination periods or other times
when it students need to be formally excused from
class, but such systems combined with a liberal excused
absence policy (not requiring a physician’s note) can
help to relieve over-utilization of medical resources for
non-medical purposes.
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Additional file 1: Data sources. Detailed description of data sources,
including case definitions, collection protocols, and available dates.
Additional file 2: Summary surveillance systems. A summary table
comparing surveillance systems analysed in terms of case definitions,
populations covered, reporter, collection methods, and timeliness.
Additional file 3: Influenza activity in the IHE and general
populations. Comparison of American College Health Association
(ACHA) influenza surveillance attack rate data for the institutions of
higher education (IHE) population and CDC Outpatient Influenza-like
Illness Surveillance Network (ILINet) influenza-like illness for the general
population, by region, United States, August 22 through December 12,
2009.
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